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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: 
An Analysis of the Post-Soviet Transition in Belarus 
 
Introduction 
The republic of Belarus has experienced several stages of transition after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The first stage was characterized by an attempt to shift away from the soviet 
production techniques, experimenting with practices drawn from the West. The temporary 
parliament of 1990-1994 implemented a series of market reforms during the first years of 
Belarusian independence. However, the market reforms generated disappointing results which 
were further compounded by a general social discontent.  These unsatisfactory results animated 
the revival of central planning and state control over distribution of goods. This reemergence of 
the state distinguishes a second stage of the post-soviet transition. The values of totalitarianism 
have remained strong for almost two decades despite the efforts in economic and political 
transformation and a general trend of capitalist development among neighboring countries.  
This inquiry seeks to provide an institutional analysis of the post-soviet transition in 
Belarus. It demonstrates that an absence of a thorough institutional inquiry drove the failure of 
market reforms. The results of market policies only further consolidated the old soviet 
institutional structure, momentarily relieving some of the havoc spurred by market reforms. 
While returning to the old methods of production and management improved the economic 
climate of the country temporarily, preservation of soviet techniques restricted the dynamic 
technological
1
 nature of the production mechanism. 
The first part of the inquiry provides a brief overview of the main policies implemented 
during the capitalization process. Then, drawing on J. Fagg Foster’s principal of institutional 
adjustment and John Dewey’s analysis of habits, this inquiry offers a critical analysis of the 
                                                 
1 In the context of this paper technology is defined as and interchangeably used with a joint stock of knowledge 
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aforementioned reforms. The second section considers the transition back to the soviet mode of 
production, seeking to establish that the preservation of soviet traditions has guided the 
Belarusian economy towards an unproductive and damaging path-dependence. This path-
dependence has contributed to retarding the process of cumulative causation and capped the 
influx to the joint stock of knowledge, both of which remain crucial for progressive institutional 
change.   
Market Reforms 
The beginning of the 1990’s appeared as a great turning point in Belarusian history. The 
fall of the USSR meant official Belarusian independence and an autonomous mode of 
development. Stanislav Shushkevich became the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet– a temporary 
governmental structure– until the first presidential elections in 1994. Economic activity was one 
of the main concerns for the new-born independent country (Savchenko, 234). There existed a 
need for a new economic system, one that would eliminate the existing economic distortions, 
productively allocate resources, and improve the living standards of the Belarusian population. 
But most importantly, there was a general yearning for a socio-political change towards a more 
transparent environment, an environment that was still foreign to old soviet traditions.  
The consensus of the Supreme Soviet was to focus on: de-etatization of state property, 
decentralization, economic freedom for producers, a single tax policy, new principles of national 
budgeting, a new banking system, and reconstruction of trade controls. Shock therapy calling for 
vast privatization served as the primary policy tool and was adopted as the first major step in 
transition to a market economy. Nevertheless, the rapidness of the new economic policies 
retained a modest character (Bogdankiewicz, 337). 
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The legal framework in existence by 1993 made it possible for privatization of both 
large-scale and small-scale enterprises. The development of privatization reforms did not, 
however, imply governmental control over the adjustment process. The Ministry of State 
Property and Privatization (MSPP) of the republic of Belarus– the executive institution 
responsible for market policies– was given great freedom in decision-making: the MSPP 
functioned independently of political institutions. When considering the percentage share of total 
income contributed by private Belarusian businesses by 1994, a mere 15% of GNP (EBRD 
dataset), it becomes clear that the market reforms did indeed move sluggishly. Furthermore, 
privatization of large factories was never accomplished. Interestingly, large-scale enterprises had 
the highest potential since those were the most efficient manufacturing and assembling factories. 
This attempt of a transition to the capitalist mode of development was also associated 
with increased employment rates in cooperative and privately owned joint-stock companies; 
while there was a sharp increase in unemployment rates for the state sector. This spike in 
unemployment was caused by the reconstruction of administrative institutions (or rather their 
elimination) and bankruptcy of massive state enterprises associated with the institutional crisis 
(Bogdankiewicz, 340). In addition, rapid growth of consumption, rising inflation, and low levels 
of gross investment prevented the needed expansionary policy to promote basic capital 
reproduction and its technological renovation. Further compounding this problem was a need for 
reconstructing the military which occupied a significant role in the industrial sector for soviet 
Belarus. However, the program for a military changeover was not devised yet. 
The year of 1991 marked the beginning of the post-soviet economic crisis which was 
especially noticeable in Belarus due to consistent economic growth from 1982-1990. Market 
shock therapy lowered economic growth rates which were characterized by occasional 
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fluctuations with a general tendency of decreasing GDP (EBRD dataset).  These aspects also 
spurred confusion in market relations since production was no longer dictated by the state and 
the system for distribution of material resources had been dismantled; yet, the state diminished 
its role before establishing alternative mechanisms.   
The disappointing results induced a number of contra-arguments on the suitability of the 
chosen tactics for the economic transition as well as a general public discontent with the 
economic downturn. The idea of market reforms in Belarus takes its roots in the neoclassical 
model of economic theory and its view on the efficiency of property rights. This ideology, in 
turn, legitimized the shock privatization. As Thorstein Veblen points out in his Business 
Enterprise, “the spiritual ground of business enterprise is given by the institution of ownership” 
(Veblen, 37). While on the contrary, the dominant rights system with its state-owned enterprises 
was considered an inefficient model mainly due to a principal agent problem caused by 
asymmetric information.  
However, the efficiency of the “invisible hand” or the “Walrasian auctioneer” meant 
handing control of the previously command driven system to the workings of free markets which 
choose the most fit agents within the economy. This idea of market distribution was appalling to 
the soviet mentality which was used to viewing the state authority as the ultimate troubleshooter. 
The command system, however, guaranteed the social equality of economic agents while 
ensuring the dominance of the political power held by government elites. One can relate Hyman 
Minsky’s idea on the usefulness of markets in relation to this issue when he states:  
The market mechanism is a good enough device for making social decisions about 
unimportant matters such as the mix of colors in the production of frocks, the length of 
the skirts, or the flavors of ice cream, it cannot and it should not be relied upon for 
important big matters such as the distribution of income, the maintenance of economic 
stability, the capital development of the economy and the education and training of the 
young (Minsky, 101). 
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Crude implementation of the market reforms served a clear ceremonial function in 
bringing the Belarusian nation away from the socialist mentality: it served as an attempt to 
corrupt the existing set of ceremonial values. It came as no surprise that the liberalist
2
 Supreme 
Soviet decided to continue market shock therapy. The belief was that eventually market reform 
would generate more satisfying results, more closely paralleling the observed apparent efficiency 
of the capitalist mode of production in the West. However, the Belarusian parliament failed to 
consider the fact that Belarus did not have a proper institutional setting for such abrupt changes. 
Furthermore, there was no instrumental inquiry into how best to coordinate the process of 
implementing market policies (i.e. introducing technological innovations) within the existing 
institutional structure. In fact, state institutions of the soviet type were eradicated as a dark 
footprint of soviet deficiency.  
Ultimately, the market reforms were implemented in a very spontaneous fashion. The 
Supreme Soviet did not initiate any specific political power arrangements to provide economic 
security and reduce transaction costs for newly privatized businesses, nor did they design the 
property rights system in accordance with the institutional structure at the time. The results 
indicated that there existed a clear conflict of instrumental vs. ceremonial functions between the 
institutions of the two systems, which was not solicitously considered in regards to policy 
implementation. 
Institutional Grounds 
The coercion of new technology in the form of market practices was foreign to the 
eloquently-developed and ingrained soviet mentality (i.e. soviet habits). This alienation led to 
social conflict as a result of problems with the existing institutional structure. Institutional 
structures characterize the habits of use and wont that allow people to act and respond with a 
                                                 
2 It was the majority of the  liberals in the Supreme Soviet as opposed to the conservative representatives 
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high degree of confidence in their expectations (Neale, 1180).  Habits, according to Dewey, are 
“a kind of human activity which are influenced by prior activity and hence, are acquired” 
(Dewey, 31). Institutions give continuity to actions and assure that each action suits the actions 
of other people to maintain the ongoing process. This implies systematization of minor elements 
of action, which remains projective and dynamic in quality (Dewey, 31). Society, in turn, exists 
as a set of institutional systems, which are based on a set of socially prescribed patterns of 
behavior or habits (Bush, 127). This implies a concatenation of individuals and the social system, 
an interconnectedness that necessitates consideration while examining the phenomenon of 
institutional change.  
Overcoming the soviet mentality appeared to be the biggest obstacle despite the fatigue 
from soviet control and a general expectation of change prevailing in Belarusian society.  
In studying any social and hence, institutional change, it remains important to remember that 
adjusting habits requires cooperation between the organism and the environment. It is impossible 
to change habits directly; rather, change requires an “indirect modification of conditions, 
intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the 
fulfillment of desires” (Dewey, 19).  More generally, habit formation exists as the mechanism 
which internalizes socially prescribed behavior. A successful adaption of new habits requires a 
relatively mechanized and unaccustomed set of actions, both of which were lacking in Belarusian 
society. These actions cannot relate to a previous order of things; rather, these actions should 
exist as their complete opposite. An executor of such actions should act upon them 
automatically, without being involved in any evaluation processes. To force one to stop thinking 
about the old habits, the new unaccustomed actions must be different from the original ones. 
Otherwise it becomes likely that the actor will fall back into the old state of habits. And, the 
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market reforms were implemented as crude instruments with the main purpose of eradicating the 
soviet system and to fully deracinate the soviet mentality. This, in accordance with Dewey, was a 
fatal failure in attempting to change the soviet habits; since this particular action was not 
disconnected from the past ones, it continuously elicited previously established habits from the 
socialist system.  
 This brings us to the idea that any change should include two types of behavior consistent 
with the Veblenian dichotomy—instrumental and ceremonial behaviors. Instrumental behavior is 
an internal behavior that results from warranted scientific inquiry. It requires continuous 
technological development and accumulation of tools that fit a given set of skills in order to 
prolong the life process: instrumental behavior remains technological in nature and serves a 
productive purpose. Ceremonial behavior is conditioned by tradition and acquired externally 
from social interactions; it associates with pecuniary gain and promotes invidious distinction. 
Thus, the transition to market policies ignored the significant impact of ceremonial behavior; 
rather it focused solely on blind imitation of instrumental behavior borrowed from other nations 
developed under a different set of institutions.  
In analyzing a social conflict deriving from institutional arrangements, it becomes 
important to distinguish the values that form these types of behavior. These values serve as 
pivots which coordinate said behaviors. In accordance with Bush’s scheme for analyzing 
ceremonially vs. instrumentally warranted patterns, the set of values have to be targeted in order 
to restructure the institutional system. Instrumental values are a subject to a dynamic change as 
the state of knowledge changes and new technologies are discovered (a new set of economic 
policies in the context of this paper). Ceremonial values are accepted on authority and, according 
to Ayres, serve mainly to prevent change (Ayres 1961b, 103). Moreover, it remains impossible to 
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directly change behaviors by enforcing new technology. Technology drives institutional change, 
but it affects the behavior of institutions, not their values. Conversely, ceremonial dominance 
determines the degree of tolerability for a certain type of behavior given the existing institutional 
system.  
 The market reforms in Belarus indicate that the degree of past-binding ceremonial 
dominance was overlooked in favor of focusing solely on the efficient instrumental feasibility. 
Only evaluation of both feasibility standards can anticipate change within an institutional space. 
This is because ceremonial habit is part of the social fabric and as such requires attention when 
seeking recognized interdependence and locating the bounds of minimal dislocation. This 
change, if accomplished, functions in accordance with the principles of institutional adjustment 
(PIA) as put forth by Foster.  The principle of technological determination suggests that an 
institutional structure must coincide with the instrumental capabilities of the system. 
Technological determination provides us with a new set of available behaviors. The principle of 
recognized interdependence reinforces the idea that a new type of behavior has to be directed and 
mechanized since it only becomes habitual through repetition. Foster emphasizes that 
“conceptual apprehension precedes the course of action differentiating the new pattern from the 
old” (Foster, 933). Finally, the principal of minimal dislocation defines the limits of the 
adjustment process and states that any modifications have to be approved by the existing 
institutional structure. If they are not, then society can eliminate changed patterns inappropriate 
to the problem-solving process.  
While the Supreme Soviet in collaboration with the MSPP committee provided the “data” 
required by the first PIA, it failed to coordinate the “instrumental functions at a level of 
efficiency tolerable to the members of the institution” (Foster, 935). The second principle was 
Mila Malyshava  
 
9 
 
violated because there was no plan of corresponding renovation of the economic sector based on 
the new policies. The reforms were abrupt and chaotic, which could not provide the required 
level of mechanization. Most importantly, the market reforms failed to selectively target only 
those factors that were considered problematic to the society which clashed with the ceremonial 
dominance of the soviet habits.  
Market Socialism 
Spontaneity of the market reforms and ignorance towards the postulates of institutional 
adjustment caused the Belarusian society to reverse course back to the soviet mode of 
production. The summer of 1994 dispelled all economic doubts about the efficiency of market 
reforms when the republic of Belarus elected its first (and to date only) president Aleksandr 
Lukashenko. Lukashenko directed the nation back to the old soviet track in an attempt to solve 
the ongoing social conflict. In 1995 Lukashenko adopted a new route of economic development– 
so called market socialism, which marked a second stage of the post-soviet transition.  
Central planning became the dominant and driving force of economic activity once again. 
Administrative controls over prices and exchange rates were imposed in response to the rapid 
inflation and currency depreciation caused by market reforms. The majority of factories and 
services remained under the control of national ministries. Various types of tight policies were 
applied to businesses by local and central governments: regulatory changes, copious inspections, 
and prohibition of practices that were legal during 1991-1994 (Savchenko, 238). Elimination of 
shock therapy was implemented in attempt to improve growth rates, lower the structural 
unemployment differential between the “private” sector and the state-owned enterprises, and to 
prevent the emergence of an oligarchy class
3
. Resulting from distortions in income distribution, 
                                                 
3 A small wealthy class that emerged after vast privatization reforms in Russia during the early 1990’s  
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Belarusian society did not favor of market redistributive practices; rather, they preferred 
reciprocal practices of the soviet economic system.  
Although the transition to market socialism caused substantial criticism from the zealous 
advocates of market practices, the early actions of Lukashenko’s government managed to 
suppress the social conflict instigated by the ceremonial dominance and temporarily improved a 
number of economic factors such as GDP per capita, unemployment and inflation rates (EBRD 
dataset). These soviet behavioral patterns were instrumentally feasible and permitted by the 
ceremonial needs of the existing institutions and not surprisingly so given that there was no 
technological inflow. New technology does not only provide solutions to institutional problems, 
but, in fact, is responsible for creating the problems. Technological change requires alterations in 
behavior (through the value system) and thought. This change creates new problems for society 
which needs to adjust accordingly. There were no problems created as there was no knowledge 
expansion and hence, no need for the adjustment process per se.  
But what makes authorities stifle the development of technological innovations? An 
authoritarian government puts an effort into suppressing the knowledge inflow to a given stock 
of knowledge because this will consequently require an institutional adjustment, lowering 
ceremonial dominance, which will diminish the degree of authority. Hence, ceremonial 
encapsulation deprives the community of higher levels of instrumental efficiency. Such 
conservation of soviet habits conforms to Dewey’s idea that force only suffices to return a 
previous order of things and to restore familiar behavioral patterns, it does not bring change 
(Sturgeon).  
Ayres realized that in communities like Trobriand society, ceremonial practices are 
perceived as a source of instrumental efficiency, while ceremonially warranted patterns suppress 
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technological growth (Ayres 1944a, 180-190). In this, ceremonial dominance remains an 
imitation of technological efficiency via ceremonial encapsulation of instrumental behavioral 
patterns. Increasing the degree of ceremonial encapsulation, in turn, displaces instrumentally 
warranted behaviors and leads to regressive adjustments in institutions. However, unlike the 
Trobriand society, where ceremonial dominance was rationalized through magic, the totalitarian 
system in Belarus uses ideology in order maintain soviet ceremonial dominance as the main 
instrument for holding a high degree of political authority even when the living standards slowly 
depreciate.  
The government authorities present stagnating economic and social conditions as desired 
stability through the use of education and media. Education and media primarily function as a 
source of ideological propaganda, directing the asserted process of economic growth and 
eliminating undesirable pluralist thought through blocking the outside information flow. 
Absorption and diffusion of new knowledge can only occur if society thinks it can be accepted 
by ceremonial dominance. As Bush notices “knowledge that cannot be reconciled with the need 
to justify existing patterns of status, power, and other forms of invidious distinctions would not 
be intentionally sanctioned” (Bush, 141).  
This, however, does not mean that it is impossible to improve the institutional 
organization of society in a way that will promote dynamic technological changes. The key is for 
every individual to have the ability to non-invidiously participate in modifying the existing 
institutional structure.  Tool affirms that “so long as democratic means of deliberation and social 
action are available, the community is prompted to continue its experimentation with alternative 
institutional forms until the most efficient options, on present warranted knowledge, are chosen” 
(Tool, 103). This means that a democracy is needed as it functions as the only organization of a 
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community that does not promote ceremonial judgments, preventing proper adjustments desired 
by the community.  
CONCLUSION 
Belarus exists as yet another example of a post-soviet transition economy where adequate 
changes of institutional adjustment need to take place in order to start drifting away from the 
soviet mode of behavior and thought. This inquiry demonstrates that a vague understanding of 
the market system, dysfunctional institutions under the new regime, and ignorance towards the 
principles of institutional adjustment caused the Belarusian society to repudiate the market-
oriented development and indirectly instigated the soviet path-dependence. This, in turn, stifled 
technological growth as a dynamic process of cumulative causation which can only be fixed 
within a more democratic environment.  
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